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1 Private sector development and complexity
Private sector development approaches have
changed significantly over the last decades. In the
beginning, they were dominated by direct
training and often also equipping of small and
sometimes larger enterprises. This intensive
engagement limited the scale and impact that
could be achieved. In the mid-nineties many
donors shifted from working directly with
enterprises towards supporting intermediaries
that provide market-based support to enterprises
(Committee of Donor Agencies for Small
Enterprise Development 2001). Subsequently,
approaches have shifted to supporting whole
market systems in developing countries rather
than individual companies. The emergence of
market systems approaches like the ‘Making
Markets Work for the Poor’ (M4P) approach
(Springfield Centre 2014) are exemplifying this
shift. Focusing on removing bottlenecks and ‘root
causes’ of market underperformance is believed
to be a more promising approach to improving
competitiveness and strengthening growth of
entire sectors – and eventually reducing poverty.
Despite the adoption of a more systemic view,
development actors predominantly see
themselves as bringing solutions to local
problems, informed by ‘good practice’ gathered
in different contexts. The involvement of the
targeted private sector in developing these
solutions is very limited. The fact that markets
are embedded within broader social context and
societal institutions is overlooked or willingly
ignored (Granovetter 1985; North 1990).
Consequently, when working with international
development organisations and programmes, one
might think that these actors represent the
whole universe of private sector development
expertise and opinion. However, when taking the
perspective of the private sector within
developing countries, we quickly discover that
many locally funded programmes, governmental
ministries and departments, local universities,
civil society and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and even larger firms are involved in
various forms of economic development. 
The lack of recognition for change processes that
already exist or could potentially emerge locally is
a common feature of development more broadly,
not specific to private sector development (Reeler
2007). In this article we argue that private sector
development programmes should not only take a
Explore, Scale Up, Move Out:
Three Phases to Managing Change
under Conditions of Uncertainty
Marcus Jenal and Shawn Cunningham
Abstract Private sector development is dominated by the use of ‘good practice’ solutions, driven by a desire
of the development donors to control the outcome of development initiatives – with limited success.
Bottom-up participatory approaches are more appropriate to find solutions for the complex challenge of
market and private sector development. Theory-based approaches are used to design and deliver solutions to
economic development challenges. We argue that these approaches have limited potential to manage
interventions that target systemic change in complex contexts. On the other hand, alternative approaches
based on emergence have some essential shortcomings from the perspective of the international
development system. Based on our own working experience, we propose a pragmatic way forward that aims
to build on the strengths of emergence-based approaches in complex contexts but is designed to work in
the current development environment.
IDS Bulletin Volume 46  Number 3  May 2015   © 2015 The Authors. IDS Bulletin © 2015 Institute of Development Studies
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
81
7 IDSB46.3 JenalCunningham .qxd  07/05/2015  13:39  Page 81
systemic perspective, but also build on processes
that involve local market actors; or where these
do not exist engage with local actors to build the
necessary momentum for change. Solutions need
to be built from the bottom up, in the relevant
context with the relevant actors participating.
They cannot be imposed from the outside. Thus
we see development as an evolutionary process
where different kinds of organisations and
institutions co-evolve based on local need and
local capacities. This requires a search process of
what is desirable and possible within a particular
context.
Our argument for a strengthened focus on
bottom-up approaches to market development is
underpinned by the theory of complex systems.
The context in which private sector development
takes place – the economy of a particular region
or country – can be characterised as a complex
adaptive system. A complex system involves a large
number of interacting, interconnected and
interdependent elements (Mitchell 2009). In
human systems, these elements are people or
organisations interacting with each other and with
a large number of artefacts. Each actor has a
strategy that shapes their own behaviour. The
actors continuously adapt their strategies. This
adaptation is based on observation of their
environment and on past patterns of success and
failure, rather than on logical, definable rules. The
actors have multiple identities and can fluidly
switch between them without much conscious
thought. For example, a person can be a respected
member of the community while at the same time
paying bribes to a traffic officer; a university
teaching the latest business management
approaches can be very old-school in its organisation
structures or internal management systems.
Complex adaptive systems exhibit a number of
important characteristics (Jenal and Cunningham
2013):
z The interconnections, interactions, and
interdependencies among the heterogeneous
actors in a complex system lead to non-linear
effects; minor changes can produce
disproportionately major consequences. At the
same time, symptoms could appear constant
while underlying causes change over time.
z The dynamic interactions between the
elements of a system lead to emergent
properties that can only be observed on the
level of the whole system, not at the level of
an individual. The whole is greater than the
sum of its parts. The agents’ behaviour affects
the system, while the system’s patterns
constrain the agents.
z Elements of the system co-evolve with one
another, with the emergent properties of the
system, and with the environment. Through
co-evolution, the system’s history is embedded
in the present.
z Complex systems are dispositional, not causal;
observed effects cannot be traced back to a
single cause and interventions do not have a
simple effect. The disposition of the system,
which emerges through the interaction of the
components, defines the direction of change
in a system and, hence, the effect of an
intervention. Observed effects are always
modulated by the disposition of the system
much more than they are driven by a
particular intervention.
z Though a complex system may, in retrospect,
appear to be ordered and predictable,
hindsight does not reliably lead to foresight
because actors adapt while at the same time
the external conditions and systems constantly
change. As a consequence, complex adaptive
systems are inherently hard to predict. We do
not know with certainty what will happen.
Consequently, in a complex adaptive system,
solutions cannot be designed assuming linearity
but need to emerge from the circumstances. The
current capacity of the actors, the current
context, but also past experience and past
decisions affect the options going forward.
Bottom-up participatory approaches intend to
stimulate this emergence of new solutions, while
rooting them in the current and adjacent
capacities of the stakeholders.
The discussion on how to do development
differently in complex contexts has become more
and more prominent in recent years. Influential
thinktanks such as the Overseas Development
Institute (ODI) or the Center for Global
Development (CGD) have published various
reports, working papers, think pieces and blog
posts on the topic (Barder and Ramalingam 2012;
Barder 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Hummelbrunner
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and Jones 2013a, 2013b; Jones 2011; Ramalingam
et al. 2008). Also NGOs, most notably Oxfam, are
contributing to the discussion (Green 2012, 2013,
2014). Even large donor organisations such as the
UK Department for International Development
(DFID) explore the topic, for example by
commissioning research on how to improve the
delivery of development in the face of complexity
and uncertainty (Ramalingam, Laric and
Primrose 2014) or on how to better evaluate
initiatives that target systemic change (Ruffer
and Wach 2013). DFID also recently introduced a
new operating framework for its programmes
called ‘smart rules’ (DFID 2014). The framework
is intended to allow for more flexibility on a
programme level to adapt to the local context.
Within the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) there is an initiative
called Complexity Aware Monitoring, which
recently published a discussion note on how to do
monitoring for activities in complex contexts
(Britt 2013).
In the next section, we describe the currently
dominant approach to economic development,
i.e. a theory-based approach. We explain why we
believe that this approach is not responding to
the challenges of uncertainty and ignores
insights from complexity sciences on how change
in complex systems happens. We also explore an
alternative approach based on emergence.
Asking a number of questions that challenge the
emergence-based approach, in Section 3 we
suggest a pragmatic way forward.
2 Predicting results or letting change emerge?
Theories of Change (TOCs) are the core of
theory-based approaches to solving development
problems. Programme theories or TOCs are an
articulation of how and why a given intervention
will lead to specific change (Stein and Valters
2012). Funnell and Rogers (2011: xix) describe a
programme theory as ‘an explicit theory of how an
intervention […] contributes to a chain of
intermediate results and finally to the intended
or observed outcomes’.
Theory-based approaches are built on a process
of analysis, the development of an ideal solution
and the path of how to get there. They rest on
the assumption that underlying relationships
between cause and effect in human interactions
and markets can be discovered, arranged in a
causal chain from an intervention to a result and
empirically verified. In contrast, approaches
based on emergence do not anticipate the best
solution; rather than predicting an ideal
solution, they focus on the potential to influence
the evolution of the system in the present
(Snowden forthcoming). As we argued above, as
economic development is happening in a
complex system, we believe that solutions to
private sector development challenges that
emerge out of the context have a higher
potential to work in the long run than the ones
that we could have predicted and built into a
TOC. Additionally, the involvement of the local
actors themselves in the process strengthens
their solution-seeking capacities and the
systems’ ability to adapt to future shocks.
When the future cannot be predicted with
certainty, results cannot be guaranteed and
solutions cannot be designed in advance. Because
of our limited ability to understand complex
systems, TOC approaches are susceptible to a
biased interpretation of the current situation. The
limited understanding of the system combined
with our human tendency to see patterns where
none exist make us jump to conclusions early in
the discovery process (Kahneman 2011). TOC
approaches consequently show a strong preference
towards specific or desirable future states, and a
naivety about how difficult it is to accelerate the
change or evolution in a complex system,
especially when very specific goals or outcomes are
determined up-front. In complex systems such as
markets, the design of causal models can lead to a
premature selection of one or a few solutions that
make sense to or suit the worldview of the
development organisations (who are not directly
depending on the functioning of the markets) at
the expense of solutions that actually lead to the
intended changes and that are adapted to local
realities. Further, the complexity of the situations
eludes the capacity of programme designers to
accurately understand the dynamics and develop a
logical intervention strategy with awareness of all
its possible consequences on the system (Osorio-
Cortes and Jenal 2013).
Approaches based on emergence can be
distinguished from theory-based approaches by a
fundamentally different understanding of
causality in complex systems. They differentiate
between distinct types of situations – ordered and
un-ordered. Un-ordered systems are not lacking
order, but are built on a different kind of order:
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emergent order (Kurtz and Snowden 2003).
Emergence is the aspect that makes complex
systems more than the sum of their parts.
Complex systems are autopoietic, they self-
organise. Self-organisation of individual elements
into new functional units allows complex systems
to gain abilities that go beyond the abilities of the
individual. At the same time, self-organisation
leads to an increased level of interconnectedness
and interdependency, constraining the choices of
behaviours each individual can take (Juarrero
1999). Farmers, for example, self-organise into
associations or cooperatives if the limitations of
this arrangement are sufficiently compensated by
additional benefits not accessible to each farmer
independently. A new level of order thus emerges. 
Emergent order has been found in many natural
phenomena such as insect colonies, the brain, and
the immune system but also in social systems
such as economies and the World Wide Web
(Mitchell 2009). The patterns that form, like
living bridges built by ants or the human
consciousness, are not controlled by a directing
intelligence; they are self-organising. Emergence
happens when a system is taken out of an
equilibrium state, but not so far that it drops into
the chaos of total randomness. This is what gave
rise to the phrase ‘the edge of chaos’, which is
seen as a status that is particularly conducive to
innovation and change (Kauffman and Johnsen
1991; Ramalingam et al. 2008). Emergence does
not follow simple, linear causality, i.e. is not
caused by a single determinable cause, but
spontaneously happens if the disposition of the
system is right. This means that an individual
actor cannot cause an emergent change, but can
only be part of it. Emergence cannot be predicted
nor can the form that the emergent phenomena
takes be known or, indeed, designed.
In a complex and dynamic context, it makes no
sense to have a classical analysis phase focused on
collecting facts and data in order to understand
the problem and design a solution in the form of
a project – particularly if this analysis takes place
months before the actual project starts and is
implemented by a third party that is not involved
in project implementation. There are three main
reasons for this:
z Firstly, we cannot make sense of a complex
context by objectively analysing it; we can only
understand it when we interact with it. There
are just too many elements to consider. As
humans, we are prone to jump quickly to a
conclusion on how something works even on
partial evidence, introducing a strong bias
both into the analysis and solution design
(Chambers 2006; Kahneman 2011; Kay 2010).
Hence, to avoid bias and truly test a variety of
possible options, analysis needs to take place
through broad intervening or probing and
observing the reaction of the system.
z Secondly, as soon as we are present in the
system, we are intervening – we cannot really
analyse it objectively ‘from a distance’. Our
presence affects the strategies and
perspectives of the actors. This effect can
often be rather small, but due to the path-
dependent nature of complex systems it can
still have an influence on the future. If we are
not aware of this because we think we are ‘just
analysing’, we might miss important clues of
changing patterns or even have some harmful
effect on the system.
z Finally, complex contexts are dynamic
contexts, even if they superficially appear
reasonably stable. Periods of stability, where
behaviour patterns of the actors can seem very
predictable, can change significantly without
warning. Property markets can exhibit a
seemingly stable pattern of growth over longer
periods of time but then suddenly crash. Such
crashes are not foreseeable, or investors would
not continue to fuel what will with the benefit
of hindsight be clearly identifiable as a bubble.
This collapse can be rapid or take longer
periods of time. Even if the symptoms appear
to remain the same, the underlying causes and
reinforcement loops could have changed.
People are very much driven by their habits
and changes can take some time to appear on
the surface. Farmers might continue to grow a
particular crop because they have been doing
this for generations even if there are
incentives to switch to another crop. This
unpredictability of complex contexts makes it
necessary to apply a continuous interplay of
exploratory intervention and monitoring at
least until we can see favourable patterns of
change emerge and stabilise.
In essence, there is no analysis without
intervention – as soon as we are present in a
system, we influence it – and no intervention
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without analysis – every step we take we need to
use as an opportunity for observation and
learning. Hence, a conventional project approach
that is based on an extensive pre-project analysis
and subsequent design with preconceived and
contractually fixed results is most certainly not
the right vehicle to deliver complex social change
in an emergent way.
Following this logic, interventions that are
targeting systems characterised by emergent
order cannot be guided by a strategy that relies
on knowledge about and stability of causal
interrelations directed towards a specific
outcome. Change has to be allowed to emerge
from the circumstances. The path of change
needs to reveal itself while it is being walked and
not designed in a meeting room (Snowden and
Boone 2007). For example, the selection of the
means of economic allocation for a specific good
or service via markets, hierarchies or networks
cannot be pre-determined through rational
analysis (or preference). It is possible that
allocation could even take place through hybrid
models, or that two different means of allocation
are chosen. Perhaps the initial means of
allocation changes over time as a service or
product becomes more familiar to the user.
This requires a more exploratory mode of
management of interventions in economic
development. Different options need to be
explored in parallel and adapted over time in
order to see how patterns change and what new
patterns emerge. If these new patterns are
favourable, they can be amplified, if they are not,
they need to be dampened. This means that
development programmes have to assist their
counterparts in developing countries – economic
development agencies, business service
providers, local authorities, or businesses of all
sizes – to develop a range of options rather than
proposing a solution. Then they can support
small explorative activities in order to see which
solution is most viable in the specific context. For
example, when a programme is tasked to
improve extension services to farmers because
publicly funded extension services are not
working, it should, instead of switching
completely to a market-based solution, explore
different kinds of service combinations. This
could mean trying a combined public and private
service offering. In essence, the goal needs to be
to give farmers more options to choose from.
Snowden (forthcoming) proposes one specific way
to implement an approach based on emergence. It
starts by using parallel, short life cycle, safe-to-fail
explorations to determine which approach or
approaches are successfully influencing current
patterns and stimulating the emergence of more
desirable ones. The portfolio of explorations is
developed by identifying a set of coherent
hypotheses by involved stakeholders. In order to
improve the chances to stimulate a viable solution
or test a broad variety of possible solutions, the
explorations should be designed to be as diverse
as possible. This is achieved by avoiding
convergence as long as possible and encouraging
debate and dissent where possible and feasible.
For each exploration the possible and likely signs
of success and a strategy to amplify that success as
well as the potential early signs of failure and
dampening strategies are identified. Once the
explorations are implemented, the results are
reviewed and strategies that lead to favourable
patterns are taken to scale.
It must be acknowledged that not all problems
we face in development are complex. Indeed,
most situations we face are a mix of ordered and
un-ordered aspects, as they usually coexist
(Kurtz and Snowden 2003). This is to say not
everything is complex, non-linear and
unpredictable. Earlier we explained that
constraints in the system limit the options and
the behaviour available to the actors. By relaxing
constraints we can move situations between the
ordered and un-ordered domains in order to
introduce novelty or more options. By tightening
constraints we choose certain options and reduce
variety so that we can improve efficiency (ibid.).
Relaxing constraints has been described as
bringing a system ‘to the edge of chaos’ to
increase the likelihood for innovation to happen
(Ramalingam et al. 2008). Tightening constraints
is done to move from a modus of exploration to a
modus of exploitation. In practice, relaxing
constraints can mean for example to introduce
new options into a situation that actors can
choose from such as new business models, new
technologies or new sources of finance. Also, as
contexts shift, movement between ordered and
un-ordered happens organically. For example, if
markets are being liberalised, actors suddenly
have many more choices as to how to act. 
A continuous process is needed in any change
initiative to make sense of the problems we are
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facing and select an appropriate strategy. Sense-
making frameworks like Cynefin can help a
project team to come to grips with a situation
and decide whether it is in the ordered domain,
where an expert solution can be sought and
applied, or whether it is in the un-ordered
domain, where an approach based on emergence
is more appropriate (Kurtz and Snowden 2003;
Snowden and Boone 2007). If we find that we are
in the ordered space, we can apply traditional
theory-based approaches with outcome-based
targets and apply good or best practice – our past
experience is useful here. In the following, we
describe ideas for an approach that can work to
solve complex challenges.
There are, however, a number of challenges in
shifting development work towards using more
approaches that are based on emergence when
tackling complex problems. The list below
mentions some. We are aware that this list is not
exhaustive.
z If pre-defining and contractually fixing results
is not the way to solve complex development
challenges, what do we agree to do together as
a donor and an implementing organisation?
How do we define whether a project has been
successful or not? How much change is
enough change?
z How do we know we are making progress? How
do we know we are doing the right things?
Whose assessment of progress matters?
Change trajectories in complex systems are not
linear and can take various shapes. Sometimes,
‘hard work’ does not show for long periods of
time but then suddenly massive changes
happen when tipping points are reached.
z How do we figure out in the beginning what
resources we need to implement a project that
leads to positive change? If we are lucky, some
encouragement is enough to see big changes
but often change will need more engagement.
z Connected to both the difficulty in assessing
progress and also the question about resource
needs is also the question of how long we need
to commit ourselves to change a particular
issue. Sometimes development organisations
are under too much pressure to see quick
results. Often change needs to be supported
over extended periods before it takes hold.
However, the opposite can also be true.
Sometimes a good idea is absorbed quickly
and local stakeholders take over an initiative.
Development programmes mostly do not exit
early if ownership shifts.
z Also connected to the resource question is the
pressure to spend funds entrusted to the
implementing agent. What happens if change
requires much less funding than anticipated?
z What to do if we think a situation is
uncertain/un-ordered, but our counterpart
thinks it is certain/ordered? Or the other way
around, we perceive a problem to be simple,
but they perceive the situation to be quite
complex? Whose reality matters?
z If we agree that we should support market
actors in developing countries to explore and
introduce more options, the big question is
how would we measure our contribution to the
resulting changes? Just as in developed
countries, governments in developing countries
are also increasingly under pressure to prove
that public funding is used wisely, so they are
also interested to attribute change to their
spending.
Perhaps related to the points above is the
question as to whether development is really
ready to let go of some of its own treasured
dogmata and fully support open exploration in
the developing world. Very often donors support
projects and programmes that fall within certain
programme categories such as private sector
development, education reform or good
governance and intervention options are limited
by these categories. Will donors really be willing
to fully support a developing country to develop a
portfolio of small experiments guided by
resulting changes rather than pre-defined
intervention options? For example, many donors
value working with small enterprises, despite
there being research that questions this
preference (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine
2003; Biggs 2002). In many countries, the small
enterprises are vulnerable and unproductive,
while the larger or rather medium-sized
enterprises are perceived to not need any
support and are overlooked as potential
cooperation partners. Similarly, not all problems
can be addressed purely by the private sector.
Many market failures need governments to
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change conditions for markets to function better
(Cunningham 2011). Donors need to be willing
to suspend their preference if local evidence or
the local context suggests that a more diversified
approach is called for.
3 A pragmatic way forward
It would be easy to stand back and describe
everything as complex with no place to
intervene. Despite complexity, we can still be
pragmatic. We also have to work within the
constraints of the development system itself. In
this way, we hope to tackle some of the questions
around approaches based on emergence that we
raised earlier in this article.
As an alternative to the classical analysis-design-
implementation logic, we suggest an approach
that is based on three closely inter-knit phases
that organically evolve into each other and might
overlap at times. Instead of starting with an
analysis, an initial exploratory phase focuses on
developing and implementing a portfolio of
exploratory activities. It is important that these
explorations are ‘safe-to-fail’, i.e. that the failure
of individual explorations does not endanger the
overall activity and at the same time does not
put any stakeholder at risk. It might be
challenging to find such safe-to-fail activities
when, for example, working with small farmers.
Development practitioners must also introduce
naive or even contradictory experiments to
ensure that more options are created. There is
no experimentation without risk, therefore
development programmes can mitigate some of
the risk, but if the market actor cannot carry
some of the risk then it will be highly unlikely
that others will follow the example.
Allowing initiatives to fail is important for two
reasons. On the one hand, if we can accept
failure, we can also take higher risks in trying
out new things. On the other hand, failures are
extremely important for learning as they tell us
about the constraints in the current system. A
bottom-up focus on developing these exploratory
activities is essential to root them in the reality
of the system. Approaches that are grounded in
the participatory action research tradition, as for
example described by Burns or Hassan (Burns
2007, 2013; Hassan 2014), seem to be
particularly adept to be used during this phase.
When implementing action research type
activities with stakeholders, it is important to use
a frame of reference for decision-making as well
as a learning model that is based on complexity
thinking (Rogers et al. 2013).
The need for coherence and a purposefully
designed portfolio of exploratory activities
ensures that the exploratory phase does not start
with any random intervention. Most importantly,
we should avoid that the exploration is limited to
any particular interests and implicitly
preconceived solutions. Most of the things we do
are based on implicit ‘theories of change’ that we
develop partly unconsciously based on our
experiences or on a quick scan of the situation. If
we do not ensure that these are made explicit, we
risk a biased exploration portfolio that only
covers a relatively narrow set of hypotheses
around these implicit assumptions. We need to
make assumptions explicit both about the type of
change we want to see – which is strongly
influenced by our values and worldview – and the
assumptions about the pathway of change – the
path we think we need to take to achieve this
change. Making assumptions explicit also allows
us to recognise different perspectives on the issue
at hand and potentially conflicting points of view.
While the reaction when applying a theory-based
approach would be to work towards converging on
an overarching theory of change, when taking an
exploratory approach it is more valuable to keep
the hypotheses about how change could happen
as diverse as possible. Besides, real-world testing
of competing hypotheses can also be used as a
conflict resolution tool.
The exploratory phase then evolves into a scale-
up phase that is more focused on exploiting the
interventions and solutions that were found to
work in a consistent way, spending more
resources on them to see more widespread
change. Essentially, this signifies a move from
the un-ordered to the ordered space. Ideally,
some of the activities and solutions that were
tested in the exploration phase would be taken
up by the stakeholders themselves without
further support and become self-propelling.
Other activities require more long-term
investment from a development actor. If scaling
up is supposed to happen in different contexts,
we cannot resolve to do more of what worked in
the original context. Replicating specific
solutions of one complex context in another
complex context is likely to fail due to the path
dependence and distinct history of each
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situation. But we can learn which conditions we
need to establish for stakeholders to engage in
activities which have a high potential to lead to
change.
A move-out phase could subsequently focus on
capitalisation and communication with the
intent to capture learning and communicate
achievements. The capitalisation should not only
document what solutions could be found for the
local problems, but also reflect on the setting
that was introduced to stimulate the changes.
Continuous monitoring of changes in the system
is naturally a part of all three phases and,
indeed, precedes them. In the exploration phase,
monitoring with real-time feedback is needed to
understand if and how the patterns change and
deliver the necessary data to decide if the change
is favourable or not. The earlier we can detect
newly forming patterns, the earlier we can
dampen them if they are not favourable or
amplify the intervention if they are. This needs
monitoring systems that are able to pick up and
make sense of weak signals. During the scale-up
phase, monitoring is required to understand
whether the changes remain consistent and
whether there is any shift in the system’s
patterns that would make the interventions less
effective. Also, there is always a need to monitor
for unintended consequences and other
dominant influencing factors that work in favour
or dis-favour of the intervention. Finally, in the
move-out phase, monitoring continues to assess
sustainability and resilience of the interventions.
Lacking pre-defined results, we still need
something to agree on between the donor
organisation and the organisation implementing
the change initiative on what we are trying to
achieve over the three phases. We suggest
agreeing on a strategic intent rather than a fixed
goal or target. The strategic intent gives the
change initiative direction while it is not a target
that it can be held accountable for – such targets
only emerge over time together with the change
strategy. One possibility for a strategic intent
could be to reduce poverty in a particular area by
improving the population’s economic
circumstances. The strategic intent needs to be
general enough to allow for a portfolio of
interventions. These could target, for example,
the markets that the population in this area
participates in – or could potentially participate
in; the services that they lack or receive in
inadequate ways; governance and institutional
issues that lead to suboptimal functioning of the
economy.
Besides continuous monitoring, the strategic
intent is the second aspect that links the three
phases together as an ongoing activity. It thereby
acts as a compass; it helps us decide whether a
pattern is favourable or not to go in this
direction and to assess whether the initiative is
making any progress. Continuous review of the
progress by both implementer and donor is
needed and go/no-go points can be defined in
order not to get locked into a path that is
deemed to fail to achieve the strategic intent.
The strategic intent can also be used to test the
hypotheses that are behind the exploratory
activities – or any activities for that matter – for
coherence. One essential feature of complexity is
that data can allow for contradicting hypotheses
(Snowden forthcoming). This means that
hypotheses can be coherent with the strategic
intent but contradict each other at the same
time. If we go back to the example of a strategic
intent of reducing poverty in a particular area,
two hypotheses that are coherent with this intent
but contradicting could be that an increased
diversity of income sources leads to reduced
poverty versus an intensification of the
production of a particular crop leads to reduced
poverty. Both are coherent with the strategic
intent but we cannot know in advance which one
works best. Having contradicting hypotheses
allows us to build up a portfolio of explorations
that achieves a broad scan for possible solutions.
The innovative part of the approach we suggest
is in the addition of the exploratory phase. While
some donors currently use so-called inception
phases in private sector development
programmes, these phases usually focus on
analysing systems and designing project-
supported solutions rather than actively
exploring options. The exploratory phase we
propose is essentially a phase of knowledge
construction through interaction, not analysis.
The stage could last from a couple of months up
to a few years, depending on the context and
situation. Complex social change can take a long
time. The transition into a scaling-up phase
would happen once enough traction is seen in
some of the implemented activities to allow for
greater investments. For example, in a complex
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situation a project cannot pre-design a business
model that is profitable and pro-poor at the same
time. Such a business model can, however,
emerge from an exploratory phase. In the
scaling-up phase, the role of the project can be to
support the wider adoption of the business
model. The scaling-up phase could much more
look like a conventional project as the
explorations have on the one hand increased our
understanding of the system and on the other
hand potentially moved some of the aspects from
the un-ordered to the ordered space. These
aspects can be exploited using good practice.
The exception is whether scaling should happen
in new contexts. Then we need to move with care
as solutions for complex problems cannot be
copied from one context into another. The move-
out phase then marks the end of a commitment,
either because a pre-defined time frame has
been reached or money envelope has been
exhausted or because the goal has been reached
to a satisfactory level.
Management of this type of arrangement needs
a very close involvement of the donor
organisation and a high level of trust between
the donor and the implementing agency. Donors
should, for example, not prescribe progress
measures. These measures should be defined
together with the implementing actor and
possibly other stakeholders based on what makes
sense for this particular initiative. Measures can
be developed based on the intervention
hypotheses and should be used as measures, not
as targets. Some interventions might aim to
increase income levels, others, participation in
household decision-making – both possible
expressions of reduced poverty. They should also
not be fixed but under continuous scrutiny as to
whether they are still suitable to show what we
need to know. These measures should be treated
as early warning signals that something is in fact
changing in a particular direction, so that
appropriate amplifying or dampening actions can
be taken. Thus these measures are more useful
for steering than for impact evaluation.
Adaptive management is essential and
procedures need to be in place describing how the
initiative’s activities are reviewed and adapted.
Transition from one phase to the other needs to
be done dynamically and for each strand of
activities separately. Go/no-go points can be
included throughout the initiative where a
decision would be taken to continue or not or if
major adaptations are needed. The organisational
set-up of the implementation unit could also be
built up in an evolving way, starting with a small
team that manages stakeholder engagement and
monitoring, adding more competences as needed
when going forward. Obviously, finding the right
staff with the necessary skills and mind-set to
implement such an approach will be a challenge.
It is important to acknowledge that many
experienced managers of development
programmes have been doing what we propose in
the preceding paragraph instinctively. They have
learned the fine art of developing programme
proposals and plans that appear to be specific
enough to please head office and political
decision-makers, while leaving sufficient room for
flexibility and learning by doing.
The proposed approach for complex problems has
not been tried in its entirety in donor-funded
development initiatives. Thus, no complete case
study exists. Nevertheless, a recent engagement
can exemplify the sense-making step that
determined that we faced a complex problem and
the start of the change initiative with an
exploration phase. A university approached a
development organisation for support to improve
the positioning of its technology transfer centre
as a broker between the academia and the
industries. The facilitator started a sense-making
exercise with different stakeholders exploring
past decisions, hypotheses about what they
thought was causing the current dissatisfaction
with the institutional arrangements, and the
proposals the different stakeholders had about
the positioning of the technology transfer centre.
From this short process it became clear that this
was not a simple problem of how to improve the
reporting lines between the centre, the academic
department, the university innovation directorate
and the industry. The problem was much more
complex and caused by increased pressure on the
academic department to show research outputs
despite insufficient funding, pressure on the
university management to improve the ranking of
the university, and the need to keep the centre
semi-independent and protected from excessive
bureaucracy. At the same time, the industry that
the centre was supporting was in a steep decline,
requiring the centre to adjust its service offerings
in order to remain valuable to industry. The
facilitator took three senior managers who had
the authority to resolve the issue on a very short
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exploration of alternatives. This involved
speaking to key stakeholders within and beyond
the university to identify possible alternative
arrangements. Through this process of
purposefully not seeking alignment, but
searching for innovative ways to meet the needs
of all the stakeholders, several options were
generated. By exploring how these alternatives
could be used it was discovered that many
proposals were in fact not mutually exclusive.
A few small changes to the institutional
arrangements were made in order to experiment
with the different options, with an agreement
reached between the stakeholders to revisit the
decisions and next options within six months.
4 Conclusion
This article is based on our experience in working
in economic development and our study of
complex systems sciences and complexity
thinking. Until now, our work has predominantly
focused on helping existing projects based in
developing countries when they are stuck, or
when they realise that their original planned
approach is not yielding the desired results. In a
sense, this is easier than trying to set up a
completely new project that is following all
principles and heuristics of emergent approaches.
Thus, we need to take an experimental approach
to this as well. We need to find a donor that is
ready to test these ideas and who can also absorb
some failure before we arrive at a fine-tuned
approach that works. Management and steering
arrangements have to be developed and tested.
The relationship between donor and
implementer has to shift significantly from one
based on top-down control to one that is marked
with the motivation to achieve change together.
We cannot stress enough how important it is
that, rather than imposing a solution, local
development programmes are supported to
introduce more variety and options into local
programmes. In these programmes, stakeholders
are confronted by a variety of market, network
and firm-level failures that cannot be addressed
through singular project interventions. For
instance, low-income countries like Rwanda are
attempting to improve the performance of their
local manufacturing and agri-processing sectors.
A wide range of development programmes is
targeting different interventions aimed at
different priority areas. However, we are not
aware of any international support programme
that is specifically trying to build responsiveness
on an institutional level in Rwanda. This would
include equipping universities, government
programmes, industry associations, training
colleges and other extension-like organisations to
become more proactive to the needs or
constraints of the private sector and other
institutions involved in development. If our
strategic intent includes aspects like poverty
reduction or environmental sustainability this
would influence the selection of favourable
changes. In Rwanda, many local organisations
are involved as programme implementation
partners, but the focus is on project delivery and
not so much on adding value or building a wide
range of institutional capacity. The local public
and private stakeholders must be supported in a
process of exploration for alternative ways to
arrange interaction and cooperation between
public and private stakeholders. This will also
increase the resilience of any economy as the
capability to work together to find solutions can
also be used after a shock or change in
environment, where a donor-designed new
business model may no longer be viable.
We are convinced that it is worth going down this
route as it will lead to development initiatives
that are more transformative and lead to
stronger and more resilient systems and overall
we will achieve a higher level of impact and
sustainability. We are not proposing a blue print
for future programme design and
implementation, but ideas and suggestions that
can be used and adapted to the specific situation
when put into practice.
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